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Abstract
This paper investigates the large and unexpected increase in cigarette prices that followed the
1997 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). We integrate key features of rational addiction theory
into a discrete-choice model of the demand for a differentiated product. We find that following
the MSA firms set prices on a more elastic region of their demand curves. Using these estimates,
we predict prices that would be charged under a variety of industry structures and pricing rules.
Under the assumptions of firms’ perfect foresight and constant marginal costs, we fail to reject the
hypothesis that firms collude on a dynamic pricing strategy.
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the Master Settlement Agreement’s impact on the nature 
of competition in the cigarette industry.  In 1997, the major cigarette companies 
signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the attorneys general of all 
50 states.  This agreement released the industry from lawsuits brought against 
them by the states in exchange for billions of dollars of annual payments to be 
made in perpetuity.  The structure of these payments effectively raised the federal 
per-pack tax on cigarettes by 44 cents.  However, in the first few years following 
the agreement, cigarette firms raised prices by more than one dollar.  This ended 
a wild decade for cigarette pricing.   
 
FIGURE 1:  Average Price of a Pack of Premium Cigarettes. 
                      (Net of State, Federal, and MSA Taxes) 
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Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic swings in cigarette pricing that occurred 
during the 1990s.1
                                                 
1 As we will discuss later, Figure 1 compares the time trend in the Knoxville data with the average 
state price of premium cigarette packs net of federal and state taxes, and net of the per/unit effec-
tive tax imposed by the MSA (from Table 1).  The two trends are very similar. 
  Between 1980 and 1992, the average price of cigarettes in-
creased at a constant rate.  Then, on April 3, 1993, Philip Morris dropped the 
price of Marlboro cigarettes by 40 cents, starting the famous “Marlboro Friday” 
price war (Issacson and Silk, 1997).  After Marlboro Friday, cigarette prices 
1
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 remained flat until the MSA was signed in 1997, at which point prices approx-
imately returned to their pre-war rate of growth.  Our main objective in this article 
is to infer the nature of competition in the cigarette industry and to investigate 
whether the MSA served as a coordinating device for firms to terminate their 
price war and collectively raise prices. 
Our analysis begins by developing a differentiated product model of the 
demand for cigarettes.  We integrate key features of Becker and Murphy’s (1988) 
rational addiction logic into the discrete-choice model of the demand for differen-
tiated products developed by Bresnahan (1987), Berry (1994) and Berry et al. 
(1995), henceforth BLP.  The resulting model depicts smokers who get utility 
from pack characteristics, and whose current consumption decisions depend on 
their past consumption and on their expectations for the evolution of future prices. 
The econometric model is estimated using quarterly scanner data on the 
sales of 291 different cigarette packs and cartons sold at five supermarkets in 
Knoxville, Tennessee between 1993 and 2002.  For each product, our data contain 
a comprehensive set of characteristics including price, length, advertised strength, 
packaging, and menthol content.  A key challenge during the estimation is to 
address the potential endogeneity of current and future prices that may stem from 
their dependence on unobserved pack characteristics.  We address this challenge 
by constructing two separate sets of instruments.  Instruments for current price are 
constructed from measures of the tar and nicotine content of each pack.  Instru-
ments for future prices are constructed in a way that exploits the quasi-
experimental nature of the MSA.  More precisely, we construct dummy variables 
for the pre-MSA and post-MSA periods that capture the way in which the MSA 
changed smokers’ expectations on future cigarette prices. 
Our econometric results are consistent with the idea that consumers are 
forward-looking and that their current smoking decisions are affected by their past 
consumption.  The corresponding price elasticities imply that firms set prices on 
the inelastic region of their pack-level demand curves prior to the MSA.  The 
possibility that firms set prices near marginal cost during this period is consistent 
with the “Marlboro Friday” price war.  Following the MSA, we see firms setting 
prices on the elastic region of their demand curves.  This provides preliminary 
evidence that the MSA changed the nature of competition in the industry.  The 
ability to infer pricing behavior from data in a single metropolitan area stems 
from the fact that spatial variation in cigarette taxes creates an incentive for firms 
to set prices locally (Sumner 1981; Sullivan 1985; Ashenfelter and Sullivan 
1987).  
To further investigate the competitive structure of the industry, we com-
bine our demand estimates with pack-level estimates for marginal cost to ask the 
following question: which models of equilibrium conduct are capable of explain-
ing firms’ actual pricing behavior?  We compare actual prices with the prices that 
2
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 would be charged by a Bertrand-Nash oligopoly and by a collusive industry.  
Within each of these two frameworks we consider three pricing rules: (1) static 
price setting; (2) “boundedly rational” price setting where firms only consider the 
current period and the following period; and (3) “dynamic” price setting, where 
firms consider the entire stream of future prices when they set current prices.  In 
the “boundedly rational” and “dynamic” models, we assume that firms set current 
prices given perfect foresight on future equilibrium prices.  The advantage of 
imposing perfect foresight is that it allows us to relax the assumption that firms 
play Markov-perfect strategies, as is usually maintained in empirical studies of 
dynamic behavior. 
For each of the six models of pricing behavior, we compare actual ciga-
rette prices with 95% confidence intervals on predicted prices.  Prior to the MSA, 
actual prices are far below the lower bound on the predictions from all six models.  
Following the MSA, actual prices are consistent with dynamic pricing strategies.  
If firms set price near marginal cost during the Marlboro Friday price war, then 
only one model of firm behavior is consistent with observed pricing behavior after 
the MSA: a collusive industry with dynamic price setting. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions.  First, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first study that estimates a differentiated product model of the 
demand for cigarettes.  Second, it introduces habit formation (addiction) into a 
standard BLP-style model, treating the stock of previous purchases as a latent 
variable.  Third, the analysis is based on a new dataset.  Fourth, our paper propos-
es a unique set of instruments for cigarette prices that are based on product cha-
racteristics that are difficult for consumers to observe, but have an impact on 
production costs.  Finally, and most importantly, we document that the MSA had 
a significant impact on cigarette pricing.  In particular we provide evidence that is 
consistent with a dramatic shift from a pre-MSA price war to post-MSA collu-
sion. 
Section 2 begins our analysis by providing background on the cigarette in-
dustry and illustrating how the Master Settlement Agreement effectively raised 
the federal tax on cigarettes.  This tax was dwarfed by the increase in prices that 
followed the MSA.  To provide context for our subsequent analysis of this price 
increase, Section 3 briefly reviews the existing literature on addiction, taxation, 
and market power in the cigarette industry.  Then, Section 4 develops our micro-
econometric model of smoking behavior.  It begins from a simple model of utili-
ty-maximizing behavior for a forward-looking smoker who is addicted to 
cigarettes.  After discussing how we model expectations and addiction, Section 5 
presents the econometric model and discusses identification.  Section 6 describes 
the data used during the estimation.  We discuss the resulting demand estimates in 
Section 7, conduct the revealed-preference analysis of the supply side of the 
market in Section 8, and provide concluding comments in Section 9.  Additional 
3
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 details on the MSA and robustness checks on the estimation are provided in a 
supplemental (online) Appendix. 
 
2. The Cigarette Industry and the Master Settlement Agreement2
 
 
Throughout the past century, six firms accounted for virtually all cigarettes pro-
duced in the United States.  In 1997, five of these firms accounted for 99.9% of 
domestic sales: Philip Morris (49.2%), RJ Reynolds (24.5%), Brown and Wil-
liamson (16.2%), Lorillard (8.7%), and Liggett (1.3%) (Bulow and Klemperer 
1998).3
The multiplicity of cigarette brands can be divided into two broad catego-
ries, discount and premium.  For much of the 20th century, virtually all cigarettes 
were considered premium.  This changed in 1980, when Liggett introduced dis-
count cigarettes which cost a few cents less per pack to produce but had much 
smaller advertising budgets and were sold at a substantial discount.  The other 
firms soon followed by introducing their own discount brands.  Throughout the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, the market share of discount brands increased, peaking 
at 40% of total cigarette sales in 1997 (Federal Trade Commission, 1997).  As a 
result, the premium brands suffered substantial declines in market share.  Marlbo-
ro experienced some of the largest losses.  Its sales decreased by 5.6% during 
1992 and then declined by another 8% during the first three quarters of 1993.   
  Each of these companies produces multiple brands (such as Camel, 
Marlboro and Salem) and each brand is associated with multiple packs that differ 
in their length, strength, flavor, and packaging.   
In response to declining sales, Philip Morris dropped the price of Marlboro 
cigarettes, its leading brand, by 40 cents on Friday April 3, 1993.  After Philip 
Morris dropped the price of Marlboros, the other cigarette manufacturers lowered 
their prices as well, initiating a price war that would last for the next four years.  
Figure 1 illustrates that the real national average retail price of cigarettes fell from 
$1.64 in 1992 to $1.29 in 1993.  April 3, 1993 has since become known as “Marl-
boro Friday” in the industry.  Marlboro Friday and the subsequent price war have 
been widely studied in the business literature (e.g., Issacson and Silk, 1997).  
After Marlboro Friday, prices remained relatively flat until the Master Settlement 
Agreement was signed in 1997.     
To understand the implications of the Master Settlement Agreement, it 
helps to have some background on cigarette taxes.  Cigarettes are taxed at the 
local, state, and federal levels.  In 2000, the federal tax increased from 24 cents 
                                                 
2 The supplemental appendix presents more detailed discussion of the institutional features of the 
cigarette industry. 
3 The sixth major company, the American Tobacco Company, was purchased by Brown and 
Williamson in 1995.  In 1999, Philip Morris purchased the L&M, Chesterfield, and Lark brands 
from Liggett, and in 2004, R.J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson merged.   
4
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 per pack to 34 cents, which was followed by an increase to 39 cents in 2002.  The 
variation in taxes across states is considerably larger.  During 2005, the state tax 
on a single pack of cigarettes ranged from $0.025 in Virginia to $2.05 in New 
Jersey.  As of 2009, more than 450 local jurisdictions had additional taxes as high 
as $2.00 per pack in Cook County, Illinois.4
Traditionally, each of the top five firms has provided one official whole-
sale price for each brand of cigarettes it sells in the U.S.  However, as Sumner 
(1981) first observed, this national “list” price is not the price at which cigarettes 
are actually sold.  The actual market price includes discounts, coupons, and other 
promotions that can vary across states and localities.  This has become an increa-
singly important factor in pricing strategy.  According to the Federal Trade Com-
mission (2007), expenditures on cigarette promotion during 2001 totaled $4.5 
billion, up from $0.2 billion in 1981.  
  Variation in state and local taxes, 
combined with restrictions on inter-state trading, creates an opportunity for firms 
to engage in spatial price discrimination.  This observation has provided the basis 
for previous studies of market power in the industry (Sumner 1981; Sullivan 
1985; Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987).   
While promotional expenditures and spatial variation in cigarette taxes 
have both risen over time, smoking in the U.S. has declined steadily since its peak 
in 1963.  Between 1971 and 2001, cigarette sales per capita decreased by more 
than half.  The decrease in consumption reflects rising prices, health concerns and 
changing social attitudes toward smoking.  As social attitudes have changed, so 
have attitudes toward the cigarette companies.  Public perception of the industry 
became increasingly negative during the 1990’s, largely due to the realization that 
the companies had withheld information about the health consequences of smok-
ing.  This new information made it easier to win lawsuits against the companies, 
and the number of court cases skyrocketed (Bulow and Klemperer, 1998). 
In response to increasing legal expenses, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, 
Brown and Williamson, and Lorillard signed a series of agreements between July 
1997 and July 1999, with tobacco growers and with the attorneys general from the 
50 states.  We refer to these agreements collectively as the Master Settlement 
Agreement, or MSA.5
                                                 
4 Data on local taxes are available from tobaccofreekids.org. 
  The MSA releases participating manufacturers from preex-
isting and future lawsuits brought against them by the states and tobacco growers.  
In exchange, the manufacturers agreed to pay, in perpetuity, billions of dollars in 
annual lump-sum payments. While most of these payments are transferred to the 
5 By mid-2003, 40 more companies had signed the agreement, including Liggett.  As an incentive 
to sign, the MSA contains provisions that require each state to extract special payments from 
manufacturers that have not signed. 
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 states and to tobacco growers, a small share has been used to establish founda-
tions to reduce youth smoking and to enforce other provisions of the MSA.6
 
    
TABLE 1: The Master Settlement Agreement 
                 (Payments in Millions of Dollars)   a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1997 1,827 1,827 1,827 0
1998 3,080 495 325 500 4,400 4,400 0
1999 7,737 253 325 500 380 9,195 7,600 33
2000 8,396 253 325 500 280 9,754 8,191 36
2001 10,228 253 325 500 400 11,705 9,535 44
2002 10,306 253 325 500 500 11,884 9,560 44
Effective 
per pack 
tax (cents)
Florida, 
Minnesota, 
Mississippi, 
Texas
Year States
National 
Public 
Education 
Fund 
Attorney 
fees
Tobacco 
growers
Total 
Scheduled 
Payment
Actual 
Payment
 
a In 1998, Column 3 includes $50 million used to establish the Consumer Protection Tobacco
 Enforcement Fund. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the payments made by the cigarette manufacturers 
under the MSA.  The first six columns reflect the baseline level of payments 
scheduled by the agreement.  Scheduled payments to the states are listed in Col-
umn 1.  Column 2 reports some additional payments made to four states that 
signed special agreements with the manufacturers.  Column 3 shows payments to 
the National Public Education Fund, which aims to reduce youth smoking, Col-
umn 4 shows fees paid to the attorneys, and Column 5 shows scheduled payments 
to tobacco growers.  Finally, Column 6 reports the total scheduled payments.   
Actual MSA payments (Column 7) have been substantially lower than 
their scheduled levels due to an automatic adjustment that decreases the payments 
in Columns 1 and 5, if the volume of industry sales decreases relative to 1997.7
     
   
Equation (1) illustrates how this volume adjustment transforms the annual MSA 
payment from a lump sum into an effective per/pack tax. 
                              ( )( )( )1997198.0 QQaMSAMSAMSA ttttt −−= .                         (1) 
 
                                                 
6 For example, the MSA requires the industry to restrict certain types of marketing and advertis-
ing.  See Cutler et al. (2002) for a detailed analysis of the agreement. 
7 The payments are also adjusted for inflation and loss of market share to non-participating manu-
facturers.  However, the impact of these adjustments is small compared to the volume adjustment 
during our study period. 
6
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 tMSA  denotes the actual lump-sum payment made by cigarette manufactures in 
year t.  The size of this payment depends on the scheduled payment ( tMSA ), the 
total number of packs sold in 1997 ( 1997Q ), the total number of packs sold in year 
t ( tQ ), and the proportion of scheduled payments subject to the volume adjust-
ment ( ta ).  This incentive structure is equivalent to a per-pack tax (see the sup-
plemental Appendix for details).  Column 8 reports the size of this tax.  In 2002 
for example, it was equal to 44 cents per pack.      
Given the effective tax created by the volume adjustment, it should come 
as no surprise that, since the agreement was signed, cigarette manufacturers have 
increased their prices and sales have declined.  What has been surprising is the 
magnitude of the price increases.  Immediately after signing the MSA, the partici-
pating manufacturers raised the price of all packs by 45 cents.  This was followed 
by numerous smaller increases over the next four years.  By the end of 2002, the 
national average price of cigarettes had increased by more than a dollar since 
1997, after netting out increases in state and federal taxes.  A simple explanation 
for this surprisingly large price increase would be that wholesalers and retailers 
impose additional (percentage) markups.  However, the existing literature on the 
price sensitivity to cigarette taxes concludes that wholesalers and retailers set 
markups at a fixed dollar amount above costs, rather than as a percentage (e.g., 
Sumner 1981; Cutler et al. 2002).  Another explanation is that the process of 
negotiating the MSA provided an opportunity for the cigarette firms to agree to 
collectively raise prices.  Before investigating this possibility, we first provide a 
brief review of the existing literature on addiction, taxation, and pricing strategy 
in the market for cigarettes. 
 
3. A Brief Review of Cigarette Addiction and Market Competition 
 
As a highly concentrated oligopoly that sells a controversial product, the cigarette 
industry has received considerable attention.  The literature on the economics of 
smoking has addressed a wide range of issues including market power, taxation, 
advertising, youth smoking, smuggling, health, and addiction.  In this section, we 
briefly summarize key results in three areas of the literature that are relevant for 
our analysis: market power, taxation, and addiction.  Readers seeking a compre-
hensive review should begin with Chaloupka and Warner (2000).   
Compared to other prominent oligopolies, the distinguishing feature of the 
cigarette industry is that it sells a chemically addictive product.  Addiction can be 
characterized by a choice process that exhibits reinforcement and tolerance 
(Becker and Murphy, 1988).  Smoking is reinforcing in the sense that past con-
sumption increases the marginal utility from current consumption.  As one 
smokes more today, his tolerance increases, meaning he will obtain less utility 
7
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 from the same level of consumption in the future.  Becker and Murphy integrate 
these concepts into their theory of rational addiction which envisions forward-
looking consumers making optimal choices based on a stable preference function 
and a constant discount rate.   
The initial tests of rational addiction were conditioned on the maintained 
assumption that, regarding prices, consumers have perfect foresight into the dis-
tant future (Chaloupka 1991; Becker et al. 1994).  There are two difficulties with 
this assumption. First, changes in excise taxes are rarely announced more than 
three months in advance. Second, this assumption ignores adjustment on the part 
of firms.8
In contrast to the rational addiction literature, past studies that have at-
tempted to infer the degree of market power in the industry have adopted a myo-
pic framework.  Sumner (1981) developed the first econometric test of market 
power in the industry.  He observed that variation in excise taxes across states and 
time creates an incentive for firms with market power to price discriminate.  
Under the maintained assumption that the market-level demand elasticity is con-
stant, a price discriminating firm will raise price by more than the amount of a 
new excise tax.  Sumner estimates the reduced-form relationship between ciga-
rette prices and excise taxes, finding evidence of price discrimination but of a 
magnitude that is sufficiently small to reject the hypothesis of cartel behavior.  
This result is reinforced in subsequent studies by Sullivan (1985), Ashenfelter and 
Sullivan (1987), and Raper et al. (2007).  
 While consumers’ foresight may be less than perfect, Gruber and 
Köszegi (2001) provide strong evidence that consumers are forward-looking.  
Using monthly data between the enactment of a new tax and the date it went into 
effect, they find that the decrease in consumption that precedes an impending tax 
increase is equivalent to the consumption response to past and current taxes.  
Arcidiacono et al. (2007) and Coppejans et al. (2007) provide additional evidence 
in support of forward-looking behavior. 
An alternative explanation for the empirical relationship between cigarette 
prices and taxes stems from Barzel (1976).  He hypothesizes that as the per-unit 
tax on a set of heterogeneous goods increases, consumers will reduce their con-
sumption and substitute toward untaxed quality attributes, which, in turn, will 
increase average product quality and average market price.  The introduction of 
discount cigarettes in the 1980’s, provided a convenient way to test this form of 
compensating behavior.  Sobel and Garrett (1997) apply Barzel’s theory to ciga-
rettes using data on discount and premium market shares together with prices and 
tax rates.  They find that a 3-cent increase in sales tax increases the market share 
of premium cigarettes by 1 percent, providing evidence in support of Barzel’s 
theory.  In related work, Evans and Farrelly (1998), Farrelly et al. (2004), and 
                                                 
8 Forward-looking oligopolists who recognize their product is addictive would maximize profits by
 raising prices in response to decreases in lagged consumption (Showalter, 1999). 
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 Adda and Cornaglia (2006) present evidence that smokers compensate for tax 
increases by switching to cigarettes with higher concentrations of tar and nicotine, 
and by adapting their smoking style to extract more nicotine from each cigarette.    
 
4. The Model of Demand  
 
A unifying feature of the rational addiction and market power studies cited in the 
previous section is that they treat cigarettes as a homogeneous product, measuring 
quantities in terms of aggregate sales or aggregate consumption.  Homogeneity 
has become an increasingly unrealistic characterization over the past two decades 
as firms have segmented the market by introducing discount brands while simul-
taneously increasing their annual advertising expenditures by more than 500% in 
real terms (Federal Trade Commission, 2007).9
 
  Because the major cigarette 
manufacturers each sell multiple brands which are differentiated by their adver-
tised image, we would expect pricing behavior to be influenced by cross-price 
elasticities.  Thus, we depart from the existing literature by treating cigarettes as a 
differentiated product.  
4.1. Utility Function 
 
Consider a market with Ii ,...,1= consumers, each of whom chooses among 
Jj ,...,1=  packs in each of ∞= ,...,1t  time periods.  We depict a consumer’s 
choice between differentiated packs at a single point in time, recognizing that 
current consumption depends on past smoking behavior and on expectations for 
future prices.  Equation (2) represents the utility associated with consumer i’s 
choice to purchase pack j at time t:   
 
                           ijtjt
e
jtitjtiijijt pApxu εξγϕαβ +++++= +1 .                     (2) 
 
In the equation, jx  is a k-dimensional vector of pack characteristics observable to 
both consumers and the econometrician, and βi is a vector of taste parameters.  
Observable pack characteristics are assumed to remain constant across time, 
stores and consumers.10
We follow the rational addiction literature by assuming consumers’ prefe-
rences are constant over time and that smokers recognize the dependence of cur-
   
                                                 
9 See Porter (1986) for an empirical study on the effects of advertising on cigarette consumption. 
10 The influence of price on a consumer’s choice is represented by jti pα  where iα−  is the con-
sumer’s marginal utility from income.  This term is also consistent with models of vertical product 
differentiation, where iα1−  would be interpreted as the value that a consumer puts on tobacco 
quality.  A larger value for iα  implies a lower desire for quality. 
9
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 rent consumption on past consumption decisions.  That is, an individual’s utility 
from smoking in equation (2) depends on the extent to which they are addicted to 
cigarettes.  This is reflected in the itAϕ  term, where ,0>ϕ  and itA  represents 
an individual’s stock of addiction.  Rational addiction theory also suggests that 
smokers will be forward-looking with respect to price (Gruber and Köszegi, 
2001).11 ejtp 1+  An increase in the expected price of pack j in the next period ( ) will 
decrease the utility from consumption today ( 0<γ ) because addicted smokers 
recognize that increasing their stock of addiction by choosing to smoke today will 
increase their future expenditures on cigarettes.  Since the rational addiction logic 
implies 0>ϕ  and 0<γ , econometric estimates for the signs of these parame-
ters provide a test on the theoretical consistency of our model.  
Consumers may differ in their tastes for cigarette characteristics and to-
bacco quality.  To illustrate this, let iθ  represent a vector of all the structural 
parameters, [ ]γϕαβθ ,,, iii = .  We assume that a representative consumer’s 
preferences can be expressed as: iii vD +Π+= ψθ , where ψ  is a vector of 
means, Π  is a matrix of coefficients measuring how tastes vary with a vector of 
demographic characteristics ( iD ) that describe consumer i, and iv  is a vector of 
idiosyncratic tastes that follow a known distribution. 
The last two terms in Equation (2) represent mean utility from pack cha-
racteristics that are observed by consumers and firms, but not by the econometri-
cian ( jtξ ), and consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes for individual packs ( ijtε ).  We 
close the model by assuming the existence of an outside good ( 0=j ) which 
represents the decision not to smoke cigarettes (i.e., quitting).   
BLP demonstrate that the market share of the jth pack can be expressed as 
a function of the mean utilities of all goods, given the structural parameters.  
Relative to their specification, the novelty of our model is that current-period 
utility depends on consumers’ past smoking decisions ( tA ) as well as their expec-
tations for firms’ future pricing decisions ( etp 1+ ).  Therefore, prior to estimation, 
we must first specify how the stock of addiction evolves over time and how con-
sumers form expectations on future prices.        
 
                                                 
11 Coppejans et al. (2007) provide evidence that current consumption choices made by addicted 
smokers who are forward-looking will depend on their expectations for the evolution of future 
prices. Their theoretical model uses the dynamic optimization problem faced by a forward-looking 
representative agent to demonstrate that an increase in future price variability will decrease future 
consumption of an addictive good. This result is supported by their evidence on the reduced-form 
relationship between current cigarette consumption and future price volatility.    
10
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 4.1.1. Modeling Expectations on Future Prices 
 
Gruber and Köszegi (2001) point out that it is problematic to expect consumers to 
predict future cigarette prices perfectly, partly because price increases are rarely 
announced more than a few months in advance.  At the same time, Sloan et al. 
(2003) provide evidence that smokers are cognizant of long-term trends in ciga-
rette pricing.  Therefore, we adopt an intermediate approach between perfect 
foresight and myopic behavior that is consistent with both Gruber and Köszegi 
(2001) and Sloan et al. (2003).  Rather than attempting to model consumers’ 
expectations for the level of future prices, we use a dichotomous variable to indi-
cate whether smokers expect prices to increase in the future.12
We set 
  
e
jtp 1+  equal to 1, if the average real price of cigarettes in the pre-
vious quarter was higher than the average price one year earlier.  Otherwise, ejtp 1+  
is set to equal zero.  The idea is that past price changes affect the way smokers 
form expectations on future prices.  Clearly, this variable is meaningful for the 
empirical analysis only if there are both upward and downward price shocks in 
the data.  Fortunately, this is the case (see Figure 1).  Between Marlboro Friday 
and the signing of the MSA, prices were roughly constant or declining.  Follow-
ing the MSA, prices increased steadily. 
 
4.1.2. Modeling Addiction 
 
We depict the evolution of an individual’s stock of addiction to cigarettes using 
the following law of motion: 
 
          ( )[ ]11 11 −− −+= ititit AaA δ .          (3)                                                        
 
itA  is their addiction stock at time t.  It depends on the addiction stock in the 
previous period, 1−itA , the rate at which the stock depreciates, δ , and an indicator 
variable that equals 1, if the individual chose to smoke in the previous period, 
1−ita .  Notice that addiction is not pack specific.  Smokers are assumed to become 
equally addicted, regardless of which pack they choose to smoke.  This is consis-
tent with the choice process implied by the utility function in (2).  A larger stock 
of addiction increases the probability of choosing to smoke (given 0>ϕ ) but has 
no influence over which pack is chosen.  The intuition behind this feature of the 
                                                 
12 In addition, it is difficult to interpret the coefficient on the expected price. The instrumented 
variable captures any change in demand that occurred post-MSA.  While one component of the 
change may be due to changing price expectations, any factor which decreases the demand for 
smoking, such as changes to laws affecting smoking in public places, would also be captured by 
the coefficient. 
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 model is that the physical symptoms of nicotine withdrawal do not depend on 
which pack(s) an individual is accustomed to smoking.  If an individual decides to 
quit, their stock of addiction drops to zero in the following period (i.e. 
01 == −itit aA ).  A discrete drop in addiction could be explained by the use of a 
chemical aide designed to break the physical dependence on nicotine (e.g., inha-
lers, patches, pills, gum).13
The time path for an individual’s stock of addiction (
  While quitting reduces the probability that the indi-
vidual will choose to smoke in the following period, it does not preclude a 
relapse.    
iTi AA ,...,1 ) can be 
constructed from Equation (3) using three pieces of information about the indi-
vidual: (i) their sequence of smoking decisions over the first T-1 periods, 
11,..., −iTi aa ,  (ii) their prior smoking habits, as reflected in their period 1 stock of 
addiction, 1iA , and (iii) the rate at which their stock depreciates.  We assume the 
depreciation rate is known to the econometrician and focus on the first two com-
ponents.14
11,..., −iTi aa
  In principle, both could be collected from long panel surveys of indi-
vidual smoking behavior and cigarette purchases.  Unfortunately, such data are 
not readily available.  Therefore, we propose a simple approach that uses the 
available market-level data to simulate  and that uses data on demo-
graphic characteristics of smokers to control for unobserved heterogeneity in 1iA .    
We begin by normalizing the level of the addiction stock in the first period 
to equal zero for all individuals ( iAi ∀= ,01 ).  This normalization does not re-
strict the initial stock to actually be zero.15
1iA
  A constant term is added to the utility 
function to absorb the average level of , and interactions between the constant 
and demographic characteristics are added to control for systematic heterogeneity 
in addiction.16
                                                 
13If we were to assume that the stock does not fully depreciate, we would still have a specification 
that is conceptually similar to Equation (3) since consumers’ choices are based on differences 
between the utility derived from an inside good and the outside good. We did experiment with 
specifications where the stock did not fully depreciate and found similar results. 
   
14 During the estimation we consider two alternative values for the discount rate, 0.6 and 0.8.  We 
find that both lead to nearly identical values for the price coefficients that are the focus of our 
analysis. 
15 In some robustness tests, we let the stock of addiction be any number between zero and the 
maximum value of the stock of addiction (1+(1-δ)). Remarkably, this does not make a difference 
in the estimation results because the stock fully depreciates when an individual does not smoke in 
a period, and this is quite likely to happen at some point given how we simulate the data on the 
addiction stock. 
16In an application to multiple metropolitan areas, one could also use area-specific fixed effects to 
control for variation in the initial stock across space, conditional on demographic characteristics.  
12
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Frontiers), Art. 63
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol10/iss1/art63
 In the second period, we insert 01 =iA  into (3) to express the stock of ad-
diction as 12 ii aA = .  Then market-level data on cigarette purchases are used to 
construct an empirical Bernoulli distribution for 1ia .  For example, if the market 
share of the outside good (not smoking) was 10% in period 1, then the probability 
that individual i was a smoker is 0.90.  The smoking probability is used to simu-
late the distribution of smoking decisions: 
 
112 == ii aA ,  if consumer i chose to smoke in period 1.         (4) 
012 == ii aA ,   if consumer i chose not to smoke in period 1. 
 
This approach calibrates the share of individuals assigned to smoke to match the 
share of individuals observed purchasing cigarettes in our market-level data.17
Finally, the market shares of the outside good in periods 2 through T-1, 
are used to define period-specific Bernoulli distributions for 
  
Put differently, we are modifying the BLP approach to simulation-based estima-
tion by randomly assigning each simulated consumer to be a smoker or a non-
smoker, based on the market share of the outside good in the previous period.   
12 ,..., −iTi aa .  For 
example, the moment condition used to simulate the decision to smoke in period t 
is  
 
          
t
I
i
it saI
smokingprob 0
1
11)( −== ∑
=
,                                 (5) 
 
where ts0  denotes the market share of the outside good.  The law of motion in (3) 
is used to combine independent random draws on Itt aa ,...,1  from (5) with the 
existing values for 111 ,..., −− Itt AA  to simulate Itt AA ,...,1 .  Repeating this exercise 
each period produces a series for the stock of addiction that is “fixed”, in the 
sense that it is calculated prior to the estimation and then treated the same as an 
exogenous demographic characteristic.  itA  will be uncorrelated with jtξ  because 
the law of motion in (3) defines addiction to be common to all packs.  The simu-
lated distribution of itA  will be market-specific, varying across both time and 
space.  Variation in the stock of addiction will influence the predicted market 
shares of each pack.  We choose the coefficient on addiction in the utility function 
                                                                                                                                     
An alternative approach to controlling for the initial stock of addiction would be to use a simple 
moving average representation as in Arcidiacono et al. (2007). 
17 With this strategy, the data from period 0 only enter the estimation through the simulated stock 
of addiction.  We do not estimate the structural parameters in period 0. 
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 (ϕ ) together with the remaining structural parameters to match predicted and 
observed market shares.      
 Our approach to simulating itA  is analogous to the more conventional 
random coefficient models of consumer behavior.  In any given market, we typi-
cally see some consumers purchasing products with relatively high prices, or 
extreme levels of other attributes.  In the absence of individual demographic data, 
it is common for the econometrician to explain these purchases using distributions 
of income, age, and other demographics generated from the Consumer Population 
Survey (e.g. BLP; Nevo 2001).  Similarly, since we are unable to observe the 
personal smoking history of each consumer, we can explain their cigarette pur-
chases by generating a distribution of addition from market-level data on past 
cigarette purchases combined with CPS data on smoker demographics. 
 
4.2. Discussion 
 
The discrete choice model in (2)-(5) generalizes the standard BLP specification to 
recognize that consumers may be addicted to a differentiated product.  This al-
lows us to make three extensions to the existing literature on cigarette demand 
and market power.  First, unlike the previous studies of market power by Sumner 
(1981), Sullivan (1985), Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987), and Raper et al. (2007), 
our description of demand is consistent with growing evidence that consumers are 
forward-looking with respect to price (e.g. Arcidiacono et al. 2007; Coppejans et 
al. 2007).  Forward-looking behavior is one of the key implications of rational 
addiction theory.  However, like Gruber and Köszegi (2001), we also recognize 
that consumers may have less than perfect foresight on the exact magnitude of 
future price changes.  Our framework imposes the weaker condition of perfect 
foresight on trends in near future cigarette prices.  Second, our structural model 
of the choice process acknowledges the addictive nature of cigarettes and also 
accounts for pack characteristics that affect consumer behavior but cannot be 
directly measured by the econometrician, such as advertising and brand image.  
Finally, by modeling the choice among differentiated cigarette packs, we can 
distinguish between price changes that arise from changes in conduct on the part 
of firms and price changes that arise from compensating behavior on the part of 
consumers (Barzel 1976; Evans and Farrelly 1998; Farrelly et al. 2004). 
Overall, the framework in (2)-(5) offers an intermediate step between a 
static model of the demand for a differentiated product and a fully dynamic model 
of intertemporal choices made by addicted consumers.  The principal difference 
between our framework and the fully dynamic models developed in theoretical 
work by Becker and Murphy (1988) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) is that the 
single-period utility function in (2) does not include a structural representation of 
the smoker’s recognition that their future consumption will depend on present 
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 consumption decisions.  Instead, this recognition is subsumed within the coeffi-
cient on ejtp 1+ .   
Compared to a fully dynamic model, our framework has advantages and 
limitations.  The advantages stem from its tractability.  The specification in (2)-(5) 
is capable of quantifying two key features of rational addiction theory—
reinforcement and forward looking behavior—without substantially increasing the 
computational burden of the BLP estimator.  All of the parameters of the model 
are recovered from a single-stage simulated GMM estimator that uses repeated 
cross sections of market level data.  Relative to BLP, the most significant added 
burden in this model is the need to develop separate instruments for current and 
future prices, as discussed in the next section.   
In principle, developing a fully dynamic model would provide the means 
to overcome two limitations of our framework.  First, our depiction of the choice 
process does not include a structural representation of changes in individual 
smoking intensity.  As the stock of addiction grows, we might expect smokers to 
increase the number of cigarettes they smoke per day.  This would be consistent 
with an upswing in the “cycle of addiction” predicted by Gul and Pesendorfer 
(2007).  Second, as noted earlier, we do not have a structural representation for 
the smoker’s realization that their current consumption decision will affect their 
future stock of addiction.  Building this feature into a dynamic model would make 
it possible to investigate the intertemporal tradeoffs associated with a smoker’s 
decision to purchase quitting aids such as nicotine replacement drugs.   
It would be challenging to develop a fully dynamic estimable model of the 
brand and quantity choices simultaneously made by addicted forward-looking 
consumers.  A likely starting point would be the dynamic models of consumer 
behavior developed recently by Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Gowrisankaran and 
Rysman (2009).18
 
  These models would have to be extended to formalize the 
connections between past, present, and future consumption that arise from a 
smoker’s physical dependence on nicotine.  To identify all of the structural para-
meters, one would probably need to obtain a long panel of micro data on individ-
ual smoking behavior.  We leave these tasks for future research and shift our 
focus to identifying and estimating the parameters of the single-period utility 
function in (2).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 As a preliminary step, one might consider nesting our discrete choice model within a mixed 
discrete-continuous framework such as Hanemann (1984) or Hendel (1999). 
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 5. Estimation and Identification 
 
5.1. Estimation 
 
Assuming the sijt 'ε  follow an iid Type I extreme-value distribution, and norma-
lizing the utility from not smoking to equal zero, allows us to express the proba-
bility that individual i chooses brand j in period t as:   
 
                        
( )
( )∑ +++++
++++
=
+
+
m
mtit
e
tmtiim
jtit
e
tjtiij
ijt
Appx
Appx
s
ξϕγαβ
ξϕγαβ
1
1
exp1
exp
.                    (6) 
 
Aggregating these probabilities over all individuals yields a set of predicted mar-
ket shares, conditional on values for the structural parameters (θ ) and unobserved 
pack characteristics ( tξ ).   Berry (1994) and BLP illustrate how data on actual 
market shares can be used together with data on product characteristics and the 
distribution of consumer demographics to identify θ  and ξ .  Their estimation 
strategy is based on two-step simulated GMM, where the moment conditions are 
defined by treating jtξ  as a structural error term and by using a contraction map-
ping to express it as a function of the taste parameters. 
Petrin (2002) demonstrates that the taste parameters can be better identi-
fied by developing additional (“micro”) moment conditions that match predicted 
and observed values for consumer demographics.  For example, the probabilities 
in (6) can be aggregated over consumers to predict the average age and average 
income of smokers. θ  can be chosen to minimize the difference between the 
predicted and true values for these statistics. Our micro moments are constructed 
using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). From the PSID we 
collect information on the average age and average income of smokers in Tennes-
see. 
Equation (7) shows our GMM objective function, which stacks moment 
conditions based on demographic characteristics, ( )θD , and the BLP moment 
conditions, ( )θξ .      
 
            ( ) ( )θωθωθ
θ
'' argminˆ ZWZ= ,        where     ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]θθξθω D,= .        (7) 
 
In the equation, Z is a matrix of instruments and 1−W is a consistent estimate 
of ( ) ( )[ ]ZZE θωθω' .  We refer readers to BLP and Petrin (2002) for a full-fledged 
exposition of the GMM algorithm and use the remainder of this section to discuss 
identification. 
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5.2. Identification 
 
In order to identify the structural parameters, we must address the possibility of 
correlation between the structural error term in the BLP-moment conditions and 
current and future prices.  Since consumers and firms both observe jtξ , we would 
expect firms to set current prices that reflect these characteristics.  Furthermore, if 
consumers’ expectations about future prices depend on current period prices, then 
future prices will also be correlated with jtξ .  Because prices are likely correlated 
over time, we will need two separate sets of instruments.  
First consider the endogeneity problem with future prices.  If future prices 
are a function of future unobservables, and future unobservables are correlated 
with current unobservables, then future prices will be endogenous.  The MSA 
provides a unique opportunity to develop an instrumental variable capable of 
distinguishing the effect of expected price increases on current demand from the 
effect of current prices on demand.  We treat the MSA as a quasi-natural experi-
ment and define a dichotomous instrumental variable that is equal to 0 before the 
MSA, and equal to 1 after the MSA.  The underlying idea is that the MSA was an 
exogenous event that changed the way smokers formed their expectations on 
future cigarette prices.  Since the MSA imposed the same effective per-pack tax 
on all of the major cigarette manufacturers, it should be uncorrelated with unob-
served pack characteristics, making the post-MSA indicator a valid instrument.  
To investigate the identifying power of the post-MSA indicator, we follow 
the approach developed in the econometric literature on weak instruments (Bound 
et al. 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).  We begin by calculating the Staiger-Stock 
inverse F-statistic for excluding the MSA instrument from a “first-stage” regres-
sion of ejtp 1+  on all of the exogenous variables (pack characteristics and brand 
dummy variables).  The resulting statistic is close to zero (1/F=0.0018), signaling 
that the MSA instrument has strong identifying power.19
e
jtp 1+
  Two factors contribute 
to the low inverse F-statistic: (i) a large sample of scanner data (N=23,824), and 
(ii) strong correlation between  and the MSA instrument ( 7466.0=ρ ).  To 
see why the correlation is strong, recall that ejtp 1+  is simply an indicator variable 
for whether prices increase between periods t and t+1.  After the MSA, price 
increases became much more common.  As Figure 1 illustrates, prices were con-
stant or declining before the MSA, and then started to increase rapidly after the 
                                                 
19 More precisely, the inverse F-statistic implies that the finite sample bias associated with the 
instrument is approximately 0.18% as large as the bias associated with OLS estimation.   
20 Notice that while the year-to-year variation in the instruments is minimal before the MSA, there 
is considerable variation after the MSA. Most importantly, the MSA can be reasonably thought of 
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 MSA.20
Next, consider the endogeneity problem with current prices.  To address 
this problem we construct a second set of instruments from first-order basis func-
tions of pack characteristics.  We used a Freedom of Information Act request to 
the Federal Trade Commission to obtain exact measures of tar, nicotine, and 
carbon monoxide for each pack.
  This is consistent with our intuition that the MSA would have changed 
consumers’ expectations about future trends in cigarette pricing.        
21
Consumers do have access to incomplete information about two of our 
three instruments, tar and nicotine.  Their concentrations influence the advertised 
strength of each pack (regular or light) and the sensory experience of smoking.  
Tar, which affects the cigarette’s flavor, is the total material captured on a filter 
pad when cigarettes are machine-smoked.  Nicotine content determines the inten-
sity of psychoactive reactions to smoke inhalation.  Tar and nicotine concentra-
tions vary substantially across different packs with the same advertised strength.  
For example, within the subset of “regular” strength packs tested in 2002, the 
coefficient of variation on tar levels was 0.17, and it was 0.18 for nicotine.  Fur-
thermore, the amount of tar and nicotine delivered tends to change over time.  For 
the average pack in our data, tar and nicotine changed by 6.7% and 13.7% be-
tween 1993 and 2002.  Since the exact concentrations of tar and nicotine cannot 
be observed (or experienced without smoking that pack) they do not enter the 
consumer’s choice process in our main specification of the empirical model.
  Tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide content 
are ideal instruments for price because they are continuous, they vary across 
brands, they reflect manufacturing costs, and they are not directly observed by 
consumers.    
22
We follow BLP in using first-order basis functions of tar, nicotine, and 
carbon monoxide as instruments.  We construct nine instruments: the pack’s tar, 
nicotine, and carbon monoxide content; the sum of the tar, nicotine, and carbon 
monoxide content of all packs produced by the firm; and the sum of the tar, nico-
tine, and carbon monoxide content of all packs produced by all other firms.  As 
explained in BLP, basis functions of product characteristics provide valid instru-
ments for price even if each characteristic enters the consumer’s utility function.  
Intuitively, the profit-maximizing price a firm will charge for each product will 
depend on the characteristics of the competing products that it sells and the cha-
racteristics of competing products sold by other firms.    
 
                                                
 
as a quasi-experiment. Much of the identification is from the months and years around the MSA.  
21 Our request covered the years 1999-2002.  For the earlier years in our study, data on the chemi-
cal concentrations were publicly available.  For example, see Federal Trade Commission (2000).  
22 As a robustness check, we also estimate models where tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide enter 
utility directly.  This has almost no impact on our estimates for the price coefficients in the utility 
function.  Results are provided in the supplemental Appendix. See also Footnote 32. 
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 The year-to-year variation in the basis function instruments is minimal.  
As in BLP, we assume these changes are exogenous in the sense that the firms do 
not choose prices and characteristics simultaneously.  To develop some intuition 
for the empirical power of these instruments we ran a reduced-form first-stage 
regression.  After controlling for pack characteristics and brand dummy variables, 
the nine instruments explain 44% of the remaining variation in prices.  Likewise, 
the inverse F-statistic for weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997) is less than 
0.01 suggesting that finite sample bias is not a major concern. 
 
6. Data 
 
The model was estimated by combining three types of data: (1) cigarette sales in 
Knoxville, TN for five stores that are part of a major supermarket chain, (2) a 
comprehensive set of observable characteristics describing individual cigarette 
packs, and (3) data on the demographic characteristics of smokers and non-
smokers in the Knoxville metropolitan area, as reported in the Census of Popula-
tion and the Tobacco Use Supplement to the Consumer Population Survey.  This 
section describes how we combined the three data sets.   
 
6.1. Cigarette Sales 
 
We obtained weekly scanner data on cigarette sales in five supermarkets in the 
Knoxville metropolitan statistical area from October 1993 through December 
2002.  A “market” was defined as a store-quarter combination based on our ob-
servation that nominal price changes occur about once every 90 days.  With 5 
stores, 37 quarters, and between 109 and 148 different packs and cartons in each 
market, we have 185 markets and 24,419 product-store-market observations.23  
All of the packs belong to 26 different premium and discount brands. We focus on 
the six largest manufacturers, Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown and William-
son, American Tobacco Company, Lorillard, and Liggett.24
Our scanner data coincide with national pricing trends.  Figure 1 compares 
the time trend in the Knoxville data with the average state price of premium 
cigarette packs net of federal and state taxes, and net of the per/unit effective tax 
  Together, these firms 
accounted for more than 90% of U.S. cigarettes sales each year during our study 
period.  We assume their pricing decisions were unaffected by the behavior of the 
smaller manufacturers responsible for the remaining sales. 
                                                 
23 To keep the estimation process feasible we discarded packs with negligible market shares and 
atypical characteristics.  In particular, we dropped packs which are unfiltered, “medium” strength, 
“ultima” strength, longer than 120 millimeters, or packaged in a quantity other than a pack or 
carton.  The remaining 24,419 observations that comprise the data used to estimate the model 
account for more than 85% of total sales.   
24 American Tobacco Company merged with Brown and Williamson in 1995.    
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 imposed by the MSA (from Table 1).  Following “Marlboro Friday” in April 
1993, the average price of cigarettes dropped substantially and remained relative-
ly constant until the first agreements between the cigarette firms and the states 
were signed in July, 1997.  Since then, cigarette manufacturers have raised unit 
prices by far more than the increase in unit taxes.  After taxes, the real price per 
pack increased by an average of 10% per year between 1997 and 2002. 
 
TABLE 2: Cigarette Market Shares in Knoxville and the United States, 1996 
total discount premium total discount premium
Philip Morris All 47.8 7.5 40.3 51.1 7.8 43.3
RJ Reynolds All 24.6 9.1 15.5 37.0 6.8 30.2
Brown & Williamson All 17.2 9.8 7.4 8.9 1.7 7.1
Lorillard All 8.4 0.5 7.9 2.9 0.0 2.9
Total: 4 Firms All 98.0 26.9 71.1 99.9 16.3 83.6
Philip Morris Marlboro 32.3 32.7
Philip Morris Virginia Slims 2.4 6.3
Philip Morris Merit 2.3 2.4
RJ Reynolds Winston 5.3 13.4
RJ Reynolds Camel 4.6 3.4
RJ Reynolds Salem 3.6 5.4
Brown & Williamson Kool 3.6 3.1
Brown & Williamson Carlton 1.3 2.6
Brown & Williamson Pall Mall 1.1 0.4
Lorillard Newport 6.1 0.7
Lorillard Kent 0.8 1.4
Lorillard True 0.4 0.2
Firm Brand
Market Share for Premium Brands
Market Share by Firm
United States Knoxville scanner data
 
 
The Knoxville data are also fairly representative of national market shares 
across firms and brands.  Table 2 compares the share of sales for the top three 
premium brands sold by each of the four largest firms, using national data for 
1996 from the Federal Trade Commission.  At the firm level, the scanner data 
have more sales for Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, and less for Brown & Wil-
liamson and Lorillard.  At the brand level, Winston, Virginia Slims, and Salem 
have disproportionately large market shares in the scanner data, while the market 
shares for Camel and Newport are disproportionately small. 
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 FIGURE 2:  Average Price of a Pack of Cigarettes. 
                      Premium and Discount Brands, by Firm 
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Pr
ic
e 
in
 c
on
st
an
t $
19
94
Brown & Williamson
Lorillard
Phillip Morris
R.J. Reynolds
Premium 
Brands
Discount 
Brands
 
 
Our data reinforce the stylized fact that cigarette firms do not price diffe-
rentiate within brands.  A pack of Marlboro Full Flavor 100’s is virtually always 
priced the same as a pack of Marlboro Light 120’s, for example.  However, man-
ufacturers do price brands differently.  Figure 2 shows the average price charged 
for premium and discount brands by each of the four largest manufacturers during 
our study period.  Between “Marlboro Friday” and the second quarter of 2000, 
almost all the price variation occurred between the premium and discount seg-
ments of the market, making it appear as if there are only two price trends in the 
figure.  During this period, the premium packs that comprise the more expensive 
price series cost between 19 and 30 cents more than the discount packs.  The only 
major exception to this pricing pattern occurred during 1996, when R.J. Reynolds 
appeared to initiate a price decrease in the premium and discount markets, which 
was followed by a slight decrease in the price of Phillip Morris’s discount brands.  
Then, beginning in the third quarter of 2000, the cigarette manufacturers started 
charging different prices within the premium and discount segments of the mar-
ket.  This variation will play an important role in identifying cross-price elastici-
ties during the estimation.  
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  6.2. Pack Characteristics  
For each individual pack in our data, we collected information on cigarette length 
(80mm or 100mm); advertised strength (regular or light); whether they are men-
tholated; whether they are packaged in crush-resistant boxes; and whether they 
are sold in cartons.  These are the observable pack characteristics that enter our 
empirical specification for utility.  Table 3 shows means and standard deviations 
for these characteristics, as well as the concentrations of tar, nicotine, and carbon 
monoxide that we use to construct instrumental variables.  Notice that tar, nico-
tine, and carbon monoxide vary substantially.  Most of this variation occurs be-
tween packs.   
 
TABLE 3: Summary Statistics for Pack Characteristics 
Variable 1993-2002 Before MSA After MSA
1.88 1.42 2.43
(0.54) (0.14) (0.31)
0.40 0.39 0.41
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
0.61 0.63 0.60
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
0.61 0.62 0.60
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49)
0.42 0.43 0.42
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
10.21 10.01 10.34
(4.26) (4.36) (4.15)
0.80 0.77 0.83
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
11.08 10.98 11.06
(4.20) (4.41) (3.94)
# observations 24419 8545 10463
pricet
menthol
light
carbon monoxide
length100
carton
tar
nicotine
 
 
While there is very little temporal variation in pack characteristics, the av-
erage pack price increased by a dollar during the first few years following the 
MSA.  Barzel (1976) provides one potential explanation for this effect.  He hypo-
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 thesizes that as the per-unit tax on a set of heterogeneous goods increases, con-
sumers will reduce their consumption and substitute toward untaxed quality 
attributes, which, in turn, will increase average product quality and further in-
crease the average market price.  Barzel’s hypothesis is relevant for the MSA 
because, like state and federal cigarette taxes, the volume adjustment to the MSA 
does not vary with pack characteristics.  Thus, one might expect the large price 
increase in Table 3 to stem partly from consumers reacting to a change in relative 
prices by smoking less and substituting toward premium packs, which they perce-
ive to provide higher quality tobacco.  We used our scanner data to investigate the 
empirical magnitude of this effect.  
 
6.3. Does the Increase in Average Prices Reflect a Shift toward Quality? 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the time path for the premium-to-discount sales ratio in our 
scanner data.  Between the start of the “Marlboro Friday” price war and the sign-
ing of the MSA, the share of premium packs decreased steadily amid monthly 
fluctuation.  Following the MSA, the average price of both premium and discount 
packs increased by 83 cents between October 1998 and October 2000.  Multiply-
ing this constant price increase by the marginal percentage change reported by 
Sobel and Garrett (1997) would imply a 27% increase in the market share of 
premium packs.  We observe a somewhat smaller increase: 12%.  Then, between 
October 2000 and December 2002, the price of premium packs increased by 16 
cents more than the price of discount brands, which helps to explain why the 
market share of premium packs decreased during this period.  By the end of 2002, 
the market share of premium packs was virtually the same as its pre-MSA level in 
early 1997.  Thus, Barzel’s hypothesis does not explain the large increase in the 
average price of cigarettes in our scanner data.  
One might be concerned that our data are not nationally representative.  
Nevertheless, a quick calculation allows us to dispense with quality-shifts as a 
major source for the increase in national average prices.  Multiplying the 44-cent 
effective tax imposed by the volume adjustment to the MSA by the marginal 
result from Sobel and Garrett’s national analysis, would imply a 14.6% increase 
in the market share of premium packs.  Given the 50-cent price differential be-
tween premium and discount packs, the predicted increase in the market share of 
premium brands would imply a 7-cent increase in the national average price—far 
below the actual price increase.   
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 FIGURE 3:  Premium-to-Discount Sales Ratio in Knoxville, TN: 1993-2002 
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6.4. Consumer Demographics and Market Size 
 
We used data from the 12 Tobacco Use Supplements to the Consumer Population 
Survey that were available during our study period to calculate the average age 
and income of smokers in the Knoxville metropolitan statistical area.25
Since our scanner data do not identify individual consumers, we used GIS 
software and tract-level data from the 2000 Census of Population to match each 
supermarket with the joint distribution of age and income for its most likely cus-
tomers.  To do this we overlaid “shopping zones” on Census tracts in the Knox-
ville metropolitan area and took weighted averages of age and income over the 
adult population between 18 and 70, living in each shopping zone.  Shopping 
zones were defined using a 2.8 mile radius around each store, which was found by 
Ohls et al. (1999) to be the average distance that shoppers travel to supermar-
  These 
statistics formed the basis for the “macro” side of the moment conditions used 
during the estimation to match predicted and observed demographic characteris-
tics of smokers.  Aggregating over all the CPS data, the average smoker was 41 
years old with an income of $32,511 in constant 1994 dollars. 
                                                 
25 The demographic characteristics of the sample did not change substantially over the twelve-year 
period. The effects of the demographic characteristics are identified by cross-sectional variation 
across the areas where the supermarkets are located. 
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 kets.26
The shopping zones were also used to define the market size for each store 
and, therefore, the market share of the outside good.  Our definition of the market 
size starts from the adult population between 18 and 70, living in the shopping 
zone during the 2000 Census.  We take this selected population and adjust it using 
the following three facts:  (1) According to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
20% of Tennessee’s adult population smokes or smoked at some point in their 
lives; (2) the average smoker smokes 15 cigarettes per day (75% of a pack); and 
(3) the type of retailer that provided our data accounts for approximately 10% of 
total tobacco sales (Gale et al. 2000).
  The distribution of age and income for the population living in each 
store’s shopping zone is used to construct the “micro” side of the moment condi-
tions based on consumer demographics.   
27  Thus, the market size for each store was 
defined by multiplying 20% of the adult population living in the corresponding 
shopping zone in the year 2000, by 0.75 (packs per day) by 90 (days in a quarter) 
by 0.10 (of total cigarette purchases).  Finally, to account for temporal variation in 
the demand faced by individual stores, we multiply the potential market size by an 
index that is equal to the number of consumers that visited a store in a given 
quarter-year divided by the number of consumers that visited the same store in the 
first quarter of 2000.28
 
  
7. Demand Estimates 
 
7.1. Parameter Estimates 
 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates from seven alternative specifications for 
the model.  The first two columns report the results from the simplest specifica-
tion where consumers are treated as if they are myopic and cigarette addiction 
does not influence their current smoking decisions.  In the first column, the prob-
ability of smoking is assumed to depend only on prices and whether the cigarettes 
                                                 
26 Some of our stores were slightly less than 2.8 miles apart or slightly less than 2.8 miles from 
another store in the same supermarket chain.  We addressed this overlap by truncating the shop-
ping zones to remove intersections.  Since the resulting shopping zones do not overlap perfectly 
with census tracts, the demographic data were attached to each zone based on the assumption that 
people are uniformly distributed within each tract.   
27 One concern is that people who purchase cigarettes at supermarkets may be an unusual group of 
smokers.  For example, price-sensitive smokers or heavy smokers may be willing to search ag-
gressively to find low prices.  Alternatively, they may be willing to travel to other, low-tax juris-
dictions such as North Carolina, which tends to have low cigarette taxes, and is near Knoxville.  
While we recognize the importance of this concern, we do not have a way to quantify its empirical 
significance. This is also a limitation in the well known study by Chevalier et al. (2003). 
28 We tested the robustness of our approach to defining the market by estimating the model under 
alternative definitions for market size.  For example, we multiplied the maximum sales observed 
for each store during any quarter by 1.2, 1.5, and 2.  Increasing the size of the market decreased 
the own-price elasticities slightly, without affecting the qualitative results.   
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 are mentholated, light, 100 millimeters long, and sold as cartons.  Smokers appear 
to prefer cigarettes that are less than 100 millimeters, light, un-mentholated, and 
sold in individual packs.  While these directional effects are consistent throughout 
the specifications in the table, their magnitudes change substantially when brand 
dummy variables are added to the model.   
 
TABLE 4: Parameter  Estimates from Alternative Specifications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pricet -0.611 -0.755 -0.745 -0.774 -0.607 -0.619 -0.606
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.083) (0.076) (0.081)
Epricet+1   -0.018 -0.062 -0.112 -0.107 -0.111
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.065) (0.061) (0.064)
menthol -0.335 -0.661 -0.661 -0.659 -0.656 -0.656 -0.656
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
light 0.019 0.149 0.148 0.147 0.145 0.145 0.145
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
length>=100mm -0.173 -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
carton -1.649 -1.866 -1.864 -1.871 -1.834 -1.837 -1.834
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Ait 0.897 0.849 0.903
(0.538) (0.557) (0.514)
income 0.003 0.004
(0.030) (0.030)
age -0.007 -0.001
(0.113) (0.113)
IV: MSA instrument no no no yes yes yes yes
IV: tar/nic/co instruments no no no yes yes yes yes
discount rate (δ) --- --- --- --- 0.6 0.6 0.6
brand dummy variables no yes yes yes yes yes yes
new smokers & quitters no no no no no no yes
R-squared 0.31 0.49 0.49 0.49 --- --- ---
GMM --- --- --- --- 127.23 162.30 161.05
Median Price Elasticity -1.03 -1.28 -1.26 -1.31 -1.12 -1.14 -1.11
pre-MSA -0.92 -1.13 -1.12 -1.16 -0.86 -0.87 -0.85
post-MSA -1.52 -1.87 -2.00 -2.07 -1.35 -1.34 -1.31
 
 Brand image is perhaps the most important pack characteristic we are un-
able to observe.  Familiar characters such as Joe Camel and The Marlboro Man 
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 may create an image in consumers’ minds that affects the utility they derive from 
smoking those brands.29
 Column 3 generalizes the myopic model to recognize that smokers may be 
forward looking in the sense that they recognize that their choice today will affect 
their desire to smoke tomorrow.  The resulting coefficient on the future price 
variable has the expected negative sign, but is not statistically different from zero. 
  Similarly, brands that offer promotions such as “Camel 
Cash” which can be redeemed for clothing, sporting goods, and memorabilia, may 
make those brands more attractive.  To control for branding, we added dummy 
variables for the 26 brands in our data to the simple myopic model.  The results 
are reported in Column 2.  Adding brand dummies decreases the coefficient on 
price by 23%, increases the coefficient on length by 49%, decreases the coeffi-
cient on menthol by 97%, and leads to an order-of-magnitude increase in the 
coefficient on light.  Controlling for brand effects is clearly important. 
Column 4 reports the results after adding the MSA instrument for future 
prices and the instruments for current price constructed from basis functions of 
the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide content of each pack.30  Moving to an IV 
specification decreases the future price coefficient from -0.018 to -0.062, making 
it statistically significant.  A negative relationship between current consumption 
and an expected increase in future prices is consistent with forward-looking beha-
vior on the part of consumers.  Thus, the MSA instrument delivers results that are 
consistent with the predictions of rational addiction theory.31
                                                 
29 As noted earlier, advertising expenditures are the main difference between premium and dis-
count brands.  Firms spent $11.2 billion on advertising in 2001, despite numerous restrictions on 
the allowable forms of advertising (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). 
  Likewise, the coef-
30 F-statistics of the excluded instruments from the first-stage regressions are F=560 for the MSA 
instrument and F=6536 for the set of instruments based on tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide 
content of each pack.  The supplemental Appendix reports the results from adding each set of 
instruments incrementally. 
31 A potential concern with the specification in Column 4 is that our dichotomous MSA instrument 
confounds changes in expectations about future prices with the direct effect on utility of changes 
in advertising and public health initiatives legislated by the MSA.  Fortunately, the incremental 
nature of the MSA settlement provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis.  There was a lag 
between when the first settlement payments were made (July 1997) and when the agreement on 
advertising restrictions and public health initiatives was completed (November 1998).  With this in 
mind, we ran an additional IV specification with two indicator variables.  The first indicator turns 
on when the initial settlement payments are made (3rd quarter 1997) and the second turns on when 
the advertising restrictions and funding for public education become operational (4th quarter 
1998).  Both indicators enter as explanatory variables during the first stage, but only the second 
indicator is included in the utility function in the second stage.  This produces almost no change in 
our estimated coefficient on future prices.  It decreases from -0.062 to -0.079, relative to Column 
4, and the two coefficients are within half a standard error of each other.  Full results are reported 
in the supplemental Appendix.      
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 ficient on current price decreases from 745.0−  to 774.0− .32
The last three columns of the table present the most general version of the 
model where smokers’ current choices depend on their stock of addiction and on 
their expectation for whether price will increase in the near future.
  While the magni-
tude of this change may seem small, it is important to keep in mind that brand 
dummies already capture all brand-specific dimensions of unobserved quality.  
Overall, the results in Column 4 imply that smokers consider both current prices 
and future price trends in their current smoking decisions, but the relative magni-
tudes of these two effects suggest that current prices are what drive behavior. 
33  All three 
specifications are based on a quarterly discount rate of 0.6.34
Column 5 reports the results from the baseline model without smoker de-
mographics.  The coefficients on the current price and the expected future price 
trend are both negative, suggesting that the long-run demand for cigarettes will be 
more inelastic than the short-run demand.  This finding coincides with the exist-
ing empirical literature on rational addiction (Chaloupka 1991; Becker et al. 
1994).  Not surprisingly, we also find that the stock of addiction has a positive 
effect on the utility from smoking.  Thus, our econometric results are consistent 
with two of the main implications of rational addiction theory (
  They differ in the 
way we control for demographic characteristics. 
0>ϕ  and 0<γ ).   
Introducing demographic characteristics complicates the estimation 
process because, as consumers age, their income changes.  We incorporated both 
features of this dynamic process into our simulation.  This process began with an 
initial sample of consumers for each of the five stores in period 1.  Then, to adjust 
income accordingly, we aged this distribution of individuals each year and used 
the discrete approximation to the joint distribution of age and income available 
from the Census data for our shopping zones.  For example, suppose a representa-
tive smoker enters our sample at age 43 with income in the 54th quantile of the 
distribution for people between the ages of 35 and 44.  When that individual turns 
                                                 
32 This result is robust to alternate IV specifications.  For example, adding tar, nicotine, and carbon 
monoxide as variables that enter utility directly decreases the price coefficient to -0.809.  Adding 
retail gasoline prices as an instrument produces a coefficient of -0.796.  The rationale for using gas 
prices is that the large (up to 60%) changes in real gasoline prices have income effects that might 
influence prices changed by profit-maximizing cigarette firms.  Full results from these models and 
other robustness checks are reported in the supplemental Appendix.   
33 For each specification, we solve Equation (7) using a simulated annealing algorithm with a 
Nelder-Mead non-derivative search.  Starting values were defined by the results from a simple 
logit model.  Simulated annealing tests randomly-chosen points against the current function value 
on every iteration of the GMM objective function.  This increases the robustness of the optimiza-
tion procedure to situations where there may be multiple local optima. 
34 Increasing the discount rate to 0.8, increases the magnitude of the coefficient on addiction, but 
has a negligible effect on all other coefficients and demand elasticities.  These results are reported 
in the supplemental Appendix. 
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 44, their income is unchanged.  However, when they turn 45, their income is 
redrawn based on the 54th quantile of the income distribution for people between 
the ages of 45 and 54.   
 Columns 6 and 7 report the parameter estimates from two versions of the 
model that included interactions between a constant and demographic characteris-
tics.35
 
  Since utility from the outside good is normalized to zero, the coefficients 
on age and income reflect their influence on the probability of smoking.  The 
difference between the models in Columns 6 and 7 lies in their treatment of con-
sumers who choose the outside good.  The results reported in Column 6 are based 
on using the same set of consumers throughout the simulation.  In this case, 
smokers who maximize their utility by choosing the outside good remain in the 
sample for the following period, at which point they may relapse or they may 
continue to choose not to smoke cigarettes.  The version of the model summarized 
in Column 7 replaced these “quitters” with new, 18-year old smokers.  While the 
signs of the coefficients imply that consumers who are younger and/or wealthier 
are more likely to be smokers, neither effect is statistically different from zero.  
7.2. Elasticities 
 
The last two rows of Table 4 report the median own-price elasticity for an indi-
vidual pack before and after the MSA.  These elasticities are “short-run” in the 
sense that they are calculated holding future prices constant.  As we would expect, 
our estimates for pack-level elasticities are much smaller than previous estimates 
for industry-level elasticities which treat cigarettes as a homogenous product.  For 
example, Becker et al. (1994) report short-run elasticities for the industry that 
range from 36.0−  to 47.0− and Evans and Farrelly (1998) report values between 
15.0−  and 35.0− .  In comparison, when we account for addition in the last three 
columns of table 4, our estimates for the median pack-level elasticity range from 
85.0−  before the MSA to 35.1−  after the MSA.  Because we define cigarettes as 
a differentiated product, our estimates reflect the likelihood that some smokers 
who face a unilateral increase in the price of their favorite pack will simply switch 
                                                 
35 Further generalizations to the depiction of preference heterogeneity did not produce significant 
results.  Random taste parameters ( iv ) were found to be economically unimportant and statistical-
ly insignificant.  Meanwhile, including a full set of interactions between pack characteristics and 
demographic characteristics led to statistically insignificant and economically implausible esti-
mates (e.g., positive coefficients on price).  This may reflect a low signal-to-noise ratio in our 
estimates for consumers’ (unobserved) demographic characteristics.  That is, despite our best 
efforts, the process of constructing the shopping zones may have failed to capture the complexity 
of actual shopping patterns and the relevant substitution possibilities.  Another possibility is that 
there is too little variation in the distribution of consumer demographics between the five geo-
graphic markets and within each geographic market over time, for us to be able to identify the 
extent to which tastes vary with demographics. 
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 to a different pack rather than smoke less.  Switching to a different pack may 
mean switching to a different pack within the same brand, or it may mean switch-
ing to a different brand entirely.  The notion that smokers are less than perfectly 
brand-loyal is consistent with Sobel and Garrett’s (1997) finding that an increase 
in the relative price of discount brands leads to a substantial increase in the market 
share of premium brands.  Likewise, Evans and Farrelly (1998) present evidence 
that smokers compensate for tax increases by switching to cigarettes with higher 
concentrations of tar and nicotine.  This could mean switching to a different brand 
or switching between packs within a single brand (moving from Marlboro lights 
to regular Marlboros, for example).   
Perhaps the most significant result in Table 4 is that when we account for 
addiction in the last three columns, our estimates imply that the median pack 
demand was inelastic prior to the MSA.  Setting price on the inelastic portion of 
the market demand curve is inconsistent with a profit-maximizing pricing strategy 
in a static differentiated-product oligopoly.  However, it is consistent with the 
“Marlboro Friday” price war.  Firms may have been setting prices close to mar-
ginal cost during this period.     
Following the MSA, firms set prices that correspond to a more elastic por-
tion of the demand curve.  All of our specifications with addiction indicate a large 
decrease in the median elasticity, with firms setting prices on the elastic portion of 
the demand curve following the MSA.  Together, the patterns of pre-MSA and 
post-MSA pricing are consistent with the idea that the MSA acted as a coordinat-
ing device for cigarette firms to end the Marlboro Friday price war and collective-
ly raise prices. 
 
8. Inference on Firm Behavior 
 
To further investigate how the MSA changed the nature of competition in the 
cigarette industry, we compare actual price trends with the prices that would be 
charged under a variety of alternative pricing rules, given our demand estimates.  
First, we infer the marginal cost of producing a pack of cigarettes.  Then, we ask 
the following question: given the choices that firms make in future periods, what 
behavioral model would best explain the choices they make in the current period?  
This revealed preference logic maintains that firms make equilibrium choices at 
each point in time. 
Table 5 presents the price trend we aim to explain—the annual median 
price of a pack of cigarettes in the years following the MSA.  The median price 
was essentially constant between 1994 ($1.46) and 1997 ($1.43), and then grew 
by more than a dollar between 1997 and 2002.  The remainder of Table 5 presents 
the baseline results from our analysis.  Columns 1, 2, and 3 are constructed under 
the maintained assumption that firms compete.  Columns 4, 5, and 6 are con-
structed under the assumption that firms collude.  Each column shows the prices 
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 that we would predict under a particular pricing rule, conditional on the demand 
estimates reported in Column 5 of Table 4.  95% confidence intervals on the 
predicted prices were computed and are provided in brackets.  After formalizing 
the firm’s profit maximization problem, we explain each of the rules used to 
predict prices and interpret the corresponding results.  To evaluate the robustness 
of results, we repeat the analysis after replacing our baseline estimates for mar-
ginal costs with an alternative measure of accounting costs. 
 
8.1. The Firm’s Profit Maximization Problem 
 
We envision a market with Nt firms, denoted by f=1,…, Nt, each of which produc-
es some subset Fft, of the Jt products.  Let jtmc  denote the marginal cost of prod-
uct j in period t and let the size of the market be denoted by tM .
36
τFj∈
  Firm f chooses 
the prices of its products , and ∞= ,...,0τ  to maximize its discounted 
stream of future profits:37
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Fixed costs are omitted for simplicity since they would drop out of the first order 
conditions.  We also assume that firms have perfect foresight of future input 
prices.38  As Roberts and Samuelson (1988) first noted, the assumption of perfect 
foresight on input prices seems reasonable for the cigarette industry partly due to 
the long-standing price support program for tobacco.39
In order to use (8) to predict equilibrium prices, we must first provide data 
on marginal costs.  In previous applications, marginal cost has either been esti-
   
                                                 
36 For sake of simplicity, we continue to omit the subscript for a market.  Recall that a market is 
defined as a store-year-quarter triplet. 
37 Sumner (1981), Sullivan (1985), and Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) assume that each state-
year observation they use is an independent market. In particular, states and years with different 
excise tax rates give an incentive to cigarette manufacturers to charge different prices. We make 
the same assumption in our analysis, and we assume that the cigarette manufacturers choose their 
Tennessee prices independently of their choices in other states. Thus, our first order conditions do 
not incorporate the effect of price choices in Tennessee on sales in other states. In addition, we 
follow the mainstream empirical industrial organization literature (e.g., Nevo 2001), and assume 
that the retailers’ margins are determined exogenously to our model. 
38 This assumption is not uncommon in empirical studies of dynamic behavior. For more discus-
sion on the difference between models with perfect foresight and model where agents form ration-
al expectations, see Judd (1998) and references therein. 
39 While the price support program recently expired, the legislation proposing the tobacco quota 
buyout that ended the program was not introduced to Congress until 2004.  It would have been 
difficult for firms to anticipate this event during our study period, which ended two years earlier. 
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 mated (BLP) or inferred under an equilibrium assumption Nevo (2001).  Because 
we are unable to observe firms’ marginal cost directly, and therefore need to 
estimate their marginal cost, we exploit the fact that the cigarette manufacturers 
were involved in a price war between 1993 and 1997.  More precisely, we treat 
the minimum price charged for each pack from 1994 through 1996, as the mar-
ginal cost of producing that pack.   Notice that this definition of marginal cost 
includes taxes.  Net of taxes, we find a marginal cost that, on average, is equal to 
73 cents for discount brands and 1 dollar for premium brands.   
We find it highly unlikely that marginal costs increased substantially after 
1996.  This follows from two observations.  First, the real price of raw flue-cured 
tobacco was virtually unchanged between 1997 and 2002.  While the nominal 
price of flue-cured tobacco increased from $1.72 per pound in 1997 to $1.85 per 
pound in 2002, deflating these figures by the producer price index for finished 
goods implies a 1 cent increase in year 2002 dollars.   Second, the cost of capital 
in the tobacco industry declined between 1998 and 2003. 
 
8.2. Pricing Behavior in a Static Nash-Bertrand Oligopoly 
 
We begin our analysis of firm behavior from the simplest possible model where 
the discount rate in the firm’s maximization problem is set to zero so that firms 
behave as a static Bertrand-Nash oligopoly.  This is a common assumption in the 
literature (e.g. Bresnahan 1987; BLP 1995; Nevo 2001; Petrin 2002).  For a mar-
ket organized as a static Bertrand-Nash oligopoly, the price jp  of any product j 
produced by a profit-maximizing firm f must satisfy the Jx1 vector of first order 
conditions in equation (9). 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
∈
=
∂
∂
−+
tfFr jt
jtr
trtrtj p
ps
mcpps
,
0,, .                             (9) 
 
The market share of the jth product ( jts ) is a function of the prices charged for all 
the products in the market.  Equation (9) can be solved for a vector of markups 
over marginal cost by defining jtrtjrt psE ∂∂= , Jrj ,...,1, = , and jrtΩ  
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 As in Bresnahan (1987) and Nevo (2001), *tΩ  is matrix of indicator va-
riables which relate each product to its producer.  For example, with single-
product firms, *tΩ  would be the identity matrix. Equation (10) expresses the first 
order conditions as a function of the ownership matrix in order to define the 
markup above marginal cost for all of the J products in the market. 
 
      ( )tttt psmcp 1−Ω=− .                                          (10) 
 
Given our data on the marginal cost of producing cigarettes, Equation (10) impli-
citly defines the vector of prices that would be charged by a static Bertrand-Nash 
oligopoly in equilibrium.   
Equation (10) allows us to predict the prices that would be charged by 
firms in a static Nash-Bertrand oligopoly.  Specifically, we use numerical me-
thods to solve the system in (10) for tp , given our point estimates for the demand 
parameters from Column 5 of Table 4.40
 Column 1 of Table 5 compares predicted and actual prices.  The predicted 
prices are far above the observed prices in every year.  For example, in 2002, the 
lower bound on the confidence interval for the predicted median price ($3.17) was 
well above the actual median price ($2.66).  This evidence leads us to reject the 
hypothesis that firms played a static Nash-Bertrand game after the MSA. 
  Then we repeat this process using a 
bootstrapping procedure to solve for 95% confidence intervals on our predictions 
for Nash-Bertrand prices.  If actual prices fall outside this range, we reject the null 
hypothesis that firms behave as a static Nash-Bertrand oligopoly.   
 
8.3. Pricing Behavior in a Two Period Nash-Bertrand Oligopoly 
 
Now consider the case where firms maximize their discounted stream of future 
profits but only look ahead one period.  In this model of bounded rationality, 
firms set prices in period t given their perfect foresight on the prices that will be 
charged in period 1+t .  To illustrate this, let *jtp  denote the equilibrium price for 
product j at time t.  Then, firm f’s first order condition corresponding to the choice 
at time t for product j, can be written as: 
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40 We use a rootfinding algorithm to solve for the p-vector that satisfies (10) under each set of 
parameter estimates reported in Table 4. 
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 The first two terms are the same as in the static Nash-Bertrand case.  The third 
term introduces the dynamics.  To interpret the dynamic term, consider the effect 
of a current period price increase on an individual’s probability of purchasing 
pack r next period: 
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The firm knows that a price increase today has the potential to decrease an indi-
vidual’s stock of addiction tomorrow by decreasing their probability of smoking 
today.  This is reflected in the second term to the right of the equality in (12): 
tjti pA ,1, ∂∂ + .  The firm also knows that a decrease in the individual’s stock of 
addiction tomorrow will decrease their probability of smoking pack r tomorrow.  
This is reflected in the first term to the right of the equality in (12): 
1,1,, ++ ∂∂ titri As .  It is straightforward to demonstrate that the product of these two 
partial derivatives is strictly negative given the specification for utility in (2), 
positive market shares, 0>φ , and 0<α .  Finally, summing (12) over the popu-
lation of consumers yields the aggregate effect on the market share next period 
that is captured by the third term in (11).   
Overall, increasing prices today will decrease demand tomorrow.  There-
fore, the prices predicted by this data generating process will be lower than the 
prices predicted under a static Nash-Bertrand oligopoly.  A collusive industry may 
choose to lower prices even further, depending on the relative returns to increas-
ing current prices and to increasing the future stock of addiction.  Equation (13) 
defines the markups above marginal cost for all of the products in the market, 
given the structure of the industry defined by tΩ  .  
 
           ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttt m cppsm cp Ω−+Ω=− ++− 1* 11 β .       (13) 
 
To solve (13), we set * 1+tp  equal to its observed (equilibrium) value and solve for 
the tp  vector that clears the market.  
Column 2 of Table 5 shows the predicted prices from the model of 
bounded rationality where firms play a two-period Nash-Bertrand pricing game.  
The predicted prices are approximately five to ten percent lower than the static 
Nash-Bertrand model, but they are still well above the observed prices in every 
year.  Thus, we reject the hypothesis that firms were engaged in a two-period 
Nash-Bertrand pricing game after the MSA. 
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 8.4. Pricing Behavior in a Dynamic Nash-Bertrand Oligopoly 
 
Next we consider a more dynamic version of the model based on a looser notion 
of bounded rationality.  As in the two-period model, firms are still assumed to 
make current pricing decisions using their perfect foresight of near-future equili-
brium prices.  The difference is that now firms are modeled as if they consider the 
full stream of discounted profits from all future periods.41
 
  Equation (14) is the 
first order condition that provides the basis for our price predictions in this long-
term Nash-Bertrand pricing game.  
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In period t, firms know the equilibrium prices that will be charged in periods 1+t  
and 2+t .  They also recognize that their current pricing decisions will have 
ripple effects in periods 3 through T.  However, they expect equilibrium returns to 
remain constant after period 2+t .  This approach depicts firms that are unable to 
predict exact market conditions far in advance but nonetheless recognize that their 
current pricing decisions may have long-term consequences.  They predict these 
long-term consequences by extrapolating their expectations about near-future 
market conditions.    
As in the static and two-period cases, we use the system of first order con-
ditions to solve for the vector of current period prices that would maximize prof-
its, given firms’ expectations about the future and the structure of the market.  
Equation (15) expresses the system of first order conditions in matrix notation.  
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Column 3 of Table 5 reports the predicted prices.  They are approximately ten to 
fifteen percent lower than our predictions for the two-period pricing rule but, 
                                                 
41 See Tan (2006) for a dynamic oligopoly model of the cigarette industry that studies the effects 
of anti-smoking policies on the market structure. Firms are modeled as competing in price and 
advertising in a dynamic game.  Tan (2004) develops a similar dynamic oligopoly model where 
firms are assumed to collude in price and compete in advertising. 
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 again, they are still well above the observed prices for all years.  While we reject 
the hypothesis that firms began a long-term Nash-Bertrand game after the MSA, 
the overall patterns of results in the first three columns of Table 5 are still sugges-
tive of dynamic pricing behavior.  As we move from the “static” model in Col-
umn 1 to the “dynamic” model in Column 3, point estimates for predicted prices 
move closer to the actual prices in our data.  As a final step, we repeat the analysis 
in Columns 1-3 for a collusive industry. 
 
TABLE 5: Comparison between Actual Prices and Predictions from 
                           Competing Models a 
Static 2 period dynamic Static 2 period dynamic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.14 2.94 2.93 3.38 2.88 2.86
[2.74  3.84] [2.76  3.53] [2.76  3.49] [2.88  4.41] [2.74  3.48] [2.72  3.39]
3.25 3.04 2.96 3.49 2.99 2.78
[2.85  3.95] [2.85  3.64] [2.81  3.36] [2.98  4.53] [2.83  3.61] [2.62  3.13]
3.37 3.18 3.06 3.61 3.20 2.85
[2.98  4.09] [2.99  3.80] [2.93  3.31] [3.12  4.65] [3.04  3.87] [2.25  3.24]
3.46 3.29 3.08 3.70 3.21 2.65
[3.08  4.14] [3.09  3.87] [2.90  3.15] [3.22  4.73] [3.08  3.77] [1.74  3.34]
3.51 3.34 3.07 3.71 3.16 2.54
[3.13  4.18] [3.14  3.92] [2.86  3.20] [3.25  4.69] [3.07  3.65] [1.60  3.37]
3.55 3.40 3.19 3.74 3.27 2.67
[3.17  4.22] [3.18  3.99] [3.03  3.28] [3.29  4.75] [3.17  3.84] [1.95  3.42]
Nash-Bertrand Oligopoly Collusion
1.65
1.431997
1998
Year
Actual 
Price
2.66
2.51
2.36
2.101999
2000
2001
2002
 
a Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals appear in square brackets underneath point estimates.  
Confidence intervals are based on 100 draws on the asymptotic distribution of the demand-
parameter estimates from Column 5 of Table 4.  Point estimates are medians calculated over the 
distribution of (pack,quarter) observations.  Marginal costs are defined using the minimum price 
charged for each pack during the “Marlboro Friday” price war (1994-1996). 
  
8.5. Did the MSA Lead Cigarette Firms to Collude? 
 
To predict the prices that would be charged by a collusive industry under the 
static, two-period, and dynamic pricing rules, we simply repeat our analysis after 
setting all of the elements of the ownership matrix *tΩ  equal to 1.  The resulting 
price predictions will be equal to those for a cartel that maximizes profits by 
simultaneously setting the prices for every product (Bresnahan 1987; Nevo 2001).  
The results are reported in Columns 4-6 of Table 5.  
Column 4 reports the prices that would be predicted for collusive firms 
engaged in a static pricing rule.  As we would expect, prices are higher than in the 
static Nash-Bertrand game (Column 1).  Results from the two-period model are 
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 reported in Column 5. Clearly, predicted prices are still too high for the model to 
rationalize observed behavior.  For example, we predict that the median price in 
2002 would lie in the interval [3.17,3.84], while the observed price is 2.66.  
Therefore, we reject the (joint) hypothesis that firms collude using a two-period 
pricing rule.   
A comparison between Column 2 and Column 5 reveals one of the inter-
esting implications of collusion on prices for a habit-forming good.  Notice that 
our point estimates for prices in Column 5 are lower than in Column 2.  This is 
because a collusive industry is able to internalize the effect of higher prices on 
addiction.  By collectively dropping their prices, all firms can benefit from the 
increased stock of addiction in the future. 
Finally, when we model the cigarette industry as being collusive with a 
dynamic pricing strategy, our point estimates for predicted prices appear to con-
verge to the prices that were actually charged after the MSA.  The predicted 
prices in Column 6 are far above actual prices from 1997 through 1999.  Begin-
ning in 2000, our confidence intervals on predicted prices include actual prices.  
By 2002, our point estimate for the predicted median price ($2.67) is nearly the 
same as the actual median price ($2.66).  Thus, the results in Table 5 fail to reject 
the hypothesis that the major cigarette firms are forward-looking in their pricing 
decisions and began to set prices in concert after the MSA. 
 
8.6. Robustness Check: Predicted Equilibrium Prices based on  
        Accounting Costs 
 
Our rejection of competitive pricing strategy is based on the assumption that 
marginal costs are revealed by the lowest prices we observe between 1994 and 
1996.  If instead, firms set prices above marginal cost throughout the Marlboro 
Friday price war, our predictions in the first three columns of Table 5 will tend to 
overstate the prices that would be charged by a competitive oligopoly.  To assess 
the sensitivity of our results to the marginal cost assumption we develop an alter-
native set of predictions for equilibrium prices based on firm-specific accounting 
costs assembled by Bulow and Klemperer (1998).  Since their accounting figures 
exclude the opportunity cost of the firms’ resources, they should provide lower 
bounds on the true marginal cost and lead to predictions for equilibrium prices 
that are also lower bounds. 
Table 6 reports the prices we predict for the three oligopoly models under 
the accounting-cost scenario.  The pack-weighted average accounting cost (54 
cents/pack) is approximately half the size of our baseline estimate for marginal 
cost (95 cents/pack).  Despite the wide gap between the two measures, we contin-
ue to systematically reject the static and two-period models of Nash-Bertrand 
pricing.   The key difference between Tables 5 and 6 is that, under the accounting-
cost scenario, we can no longer reject the model of long-term oligopoly pricing 
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 for 2000-2002.  During those three years, the point estimates in Column 3 of 
Table 6 are nearly the same as actual prices, which are nearly the same as our 
predictions for the model of long-term collusion under our baseline estimates for 
marginal cost. 
 
TABLE 6. Actual Prices and Predictions Based on Accounting Cost a 
Static 2 period dynamic
(1) (2) (3)
2.78 2.62  2.46
[2.37  3.51] [2.40  3.21] [2.34  2.65]
2.89 2.72  2.45
[2.47  3.63] [2.49  3.31] [2.26  2.57]
3.02 2.85  2.59
[2.60  3.77] [2.63  3.45] [2.36  2.70]
3.08 2.96  2.52
[2.68  3.79] [2.71  3.55] [1.99  2.76]
3.11 3.00  2.52
[2.72  3.80] [2.74  3.60] [1.86  2.80]
3.14 3.05  2.67
[2.76  3.84] [2.78  3.65] [2.25  2.86]
2001 2.51
2002 2.66
1997 1.43
1998
2000 2.36
2.10
Nash-Bertrand Oligopoly 
Year
Actual 
Price
1999
1.65
 
a Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals appear in square brackets 
underneath point estimates.  Confidence intervals are based on 100 
draws on the asymptotic distribution of the demand-parameter esti-
mates from Column 5 of Table 4.  Point estimates are medians calcu-
lated over the distribution of (pack,quarter) observations. Marginal 
costs are defined using the firm-specific measures of accounting cost 
assembled by Bulow and Klemperer (1998). 
 
If we view the minimum prices that were charged during the price war as 
upper bounds on the true marginal cost, and accounting costs as lower bounds, 
then our results would imply that cigarette manufacturers are engaging in a dy-
namic pricing strategy that falls somewhere between collusion and Nash-Bertrand 
competition.  This is a cautious interpretation.  We suspect that our baseline esti-
mates for marginal costs are closer to the truth than the accounting figures.  It is 
hard to reconcile the large (nearly 100%) difference between accounting costs and 
the minimum prices that were changed during the Marlboro Friday price war.  
The size of this difference leaves us more inclined to reject the notion of competi-
tive pricing.   
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 Regardless of which estimates we use for marginal cost, two implications 
are clear.  First, the Master Settlement Agreement signaled a change in the nature 
of competition within the cigarette industry.  None of our models of oligopoly or 
collusive pricing are capable of explaining prices prior to the Agreement.  Second, 
we systematically reject the static and two-period models of Nash-Bertrand pric-
ing after the MSA.  Actual prices are more consistent with dynamic pricing strat-
egies that account for the long-term consequences of current pricing decisions.        
  
9. Conclusions 
 
This paper has documented a change in the nature of competition within the 
cigarette industry that coincided with the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement.  
Prior to the agreement, we observe firms setting prices on the inelastic region of 
pack-level demand curves for consumers in Knoxville, TN.  This is consistent 
with coverage of the famous “Marlboro Friday” price war.  After the agreement, 
cigarette manufacturers changed their pricing behavior, setting prices on a more 
elastic region of their demand curves.  Overall, our results support the hypothesis 
that the Master Settlement Agreement acted as a coordinating device for firms to 
collectively end their price war and raise cigarette prices.  These results are cer-
tainly suggestive, but we must also be cautious in using data from a single metro-
politan area to draw conclusions about pricing strategy throughout the rest of the 
nation.  Further investigation of data from other markets is warranted.    
 In addition to documenting a change in competition within the cigarette 
industry, our analysis has some novel features which may apply elsewhere.  For 
example, state governments have been unpleasantly surprised by the extent to 
which the volume adjustment has decreased their MSA payments (Council of 
State Governments, 2002).  We provided the first formal illustration of how the 
volume adjustment to the Master Settlement Agreement transforms the lump-sum 
payments into a per-unit tax.  With information on the state-level demand for 
cigarettes, our analysis could be extended to calculate the state tax rate that would 
maximize the combined revenue from taxes and MSA payments.   
Finally, from a modeling perspective, our work represents a first pass at 
developing a discrete-choice model of the demand for cigarettes that explicitly 
acknowledges consumers are addicted to the product and forward-looking.  There 
are at least two important issues to consider for further research.  The first is 
moving closer to a fully dynamic model of rational addiction.  Our model captures 
the effect of addiction on the current decision for whether to smoke, as well as the 
effect of smokers’ expectations for whether prices will increase in the near future.  
The main difference between this behavioral model and that of Becker and Mur-
phy (1988) is that we have not modeled the potential connection between smoke-
rs’ current choices and their recognition that their future consumption will depend 
on their current consumption decisions.  Identifying this effect in the context of 
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 our discrete-choice model would require micro-level panel data on consumer 
purchases.   
With access to micro panel data, one could also extend our work to devel-
op a fully dynamic estimable model of brand choice, heterogeneity in smoking 
intensity, and the choice to purchase chemical quitting aids that reduce nicotine 
cravings.  A model with these features would be capable of reproducing the 
“cycle of addiction” predicted by Gul and Pesendorfer (2007).  A possible starting 
point for this important line of research would be to build addiction into the struc-
ture of dynamic choice models such as Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Gowrisanka-
ran and Rysman (2009). 
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